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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
the express provisions of Section 61 of the General Corporation Law,27 which
was enacted to prevent the practice of buying into a corporation to commence
suit on a pre-existing cause of action. 28
D.G.M.
CORPORATION BOUND BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT OF ITS PREDE-
CESSOR PARTNERSHIP
The case of Reif v. Williams Sportswear, Inc.2 9 raised the issue of whether
a corporation, in spite of the fiction of its separate legal existence, is bound by
a collective bargaining agreement made by its predecessor (partnership) in the
same business, when there has been no change in the persons controlling and
owning the two businesses. The respondent corporation moved for a stay of
the arbitration proceedings on the ground that its separate corporate existence
insulated it from its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement under which
the arbitration proceedings were being sought by the petitioner union. The
motion was heard on the affidavits of both litigants.
The common law rule regarding a corporation's liability for a contract
of its promoters is that the corporation cannot be bound by such a contract,
since at the time the contract was entered into, the corporation was legally
nonexistent and, therefore, could not be made a party to the contract by its
promoters. Exceptions to this rule have been grounded upon several theories,
including: ratification, adoption, estoppel and novation. Perhaps the most prev-
alent theory in New York State is that of implied adoption, which requires that
the corporation, with knowledge of the contract, receive some benefit under it,
and that the party rendering that benefit do so without knowledge of the new
corporate identity acquired by the business.30 Other jurisdictions have invoked
the so-called "alter ego" doctrine 3' to find corporate liability in the special
situation where a corporation and its predecessor have been controlled and
owned by the same persons.
32
In the present case the Court of Appeals did not decide the question of
whether the respondent corporation had, by taking the benefit of union labor
while knowing of the collective bargaining agreement, implicitly adopted the
agreement. Part of the difficulty precluding the Court's consideration of this
question was the insufficiency of the affidavits as to a finding concerning the
27. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61:
In any action brought by a shareholder in the right of a foreign or domestic cor-
poration it must be made to appear that the plaintiff was a stockholder at the time
of the transaction of which he complains or that his stock thereafter devolved
him by operation of law.
28. Northridge Cooperative Section No. 1 v. 32nd Avenue Construction Corp., 2 N.Y.2d.
514, 161 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1957).
29. 9 N.Y.2d 387, 214 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1961).
30. Morgan v. Bon Bon Co., 222 N.Y. 22, 118 N.E. 205 (1917). For a review of
earlier cases see 1 White, New York Corporations 22 (12th ed. 1947).
31. For a thorough discussion of the "alter ego" doctrine, see. Schifferman, "Alter
Ego," 32 Calif. S.B.J. 143 (1957).
32. See e.g., Zander v. Larsen, 41 Wash.2d 503, 250 P.2d 531 (1952); Fena v. Peppers
Fruit Co., 185 Minn. 137, 239 N.W. 898 (1931).
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union's knowledge or lack of knowledge of the respondent's incorporation. The
Court, instead, relied on the "alter ego" doctrine for its disposition of the case,
saying:
A different concept of corporate liability may be invoked where the
assets of a predecessor have been taken over completely in considera-
tion of shares of stock, and no change has occurred in the underlying
business. Several authorities support the position that, where the same
men are doing business in the new guise of the corporation, and there
are no stockholders who did not participate in the earlier enterprise,
the corporation will be held liable for its predecessor's debts and con-
tract obligations ...
This corporation was as the Special Term put it, "an alter ego
of the promoters."1
33
Thus, the Court held that the respondent was bound by its predecessor's col-
lective bargaining agreement and would have to proceed to arbitration.
The "alter ego" doctrine has traditionally looked to two distinct elements
in determining whether a corporation shall be bound by its predecessor's obli-
gations. The first element is that there must be a close identity of ownership
and control between the corporation and its predecessor. The second element
is that some injustice would be promoted by upholding the fiction of the cor-
poration's separate identity. The injustice element has been found in situa-
tions where an actual fraud, or an unjust enrichment, would be permitted by a
decision in favor of the corporation. Likewise, instances where the individuals
personally liable have fled the jurisdiction34 or are judgment proofP have satis-
fied the injustice requirement.36 In the present case the Court does not ex-
pressly point out the injustice avoided by holding the respondent corporation
liable. Some suggestion of an unjust enrichment ("the corporation was able
to get union labor it might not have enjoyed except for the collective bargain-
ing agreement .... -1)37 might be found, but the quoted language of the Court
refers to the undecided question of implied adoption. Some suggestion of
waiver of the corporation's right to object to the validity of the agreement by
its participation in arbitration (taken up hereafter) might be found, except
again as the Court says, "we need not, and do not, decide that question here."38
Since this case has the aspect of a suit in equity for specific enforcement of
arbitration, other -would-be injustices present themselves. The union's remedy
at law for damages might be inadequate, so that the union should not be
lightly deprived of its equitable remedy. Here, however, the only dispute being
submitted to arbitration was a disagreement over the amount of money the
corporation owed to the union's pension fund. Possibly, the Court sitting as
33. Reif v. Williams Sportswear, Inc., supra note 29 at 389, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
34. Zander v. Larsen, supra note 32.
35. Fena v. Peppers Fruit Co., supra note 32.
36. Supra note 31.
37. Reif v. Williams Sportswear, Inc., supra note 29 at 389, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
38. Id. at 388, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
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a court of equity might have taken easy note of the questionable conduct of
the corporation in regard to the contested agreement, since the corporation in
effect admitted that it believed the agreement valid until, after having obtained
one postponement of the arbitration proceeding, its attorney advised it that the
agreement was invalid. Criticism of the "alter ego" doctrine has often been
directed against its loose application where the courts have not been careful to
find both elements of the doctrine present in a particular set of circumstances. 39
However, it appears in the present case that at least a slight showing of the
injustice requirement can be discerned. Moreover, the respondent corporation
could still raise any other defense it might have to the collective bargaining
agreement, such as the union's alleged release of the agreement, in the arbitra-
tion proceeding itself. Thus, the corporation merely lost its defense based upon
the fiction of its separate existence, where in actuality the corporation and its
predecessor were the same parties who originally contracted with the union,
and where these men by their questionable conduct made the preservation of
that fiction at least a slight injustice.
In arriving at its decision, the Court passed over the arguments made con-
cerning whether the corporation had, by its participation in the arbitration
proceedings to the extent of appearing before the arbitrator and obtaining an
adjournment, waived its right to object to the validity of the collective bargain-
ing agreement under Sections 1458 and 1462 of the Civil Practice Act. The
union analogized the corporation's appearance before the arbitrator to that of
a general appearance in a civil suit by which the defendant loses his right to
object to the court's jurisdiction. Although the Court expressed no opinion
on the question of participation, the better guess as to the eventual decision
of this question appears to be that the corporation had not participated to the
extent required for waiver, as participation is explained in the leading case of
National Cash Register Co. v. Wilson.
40
D. P.S.
ELECTION NOT IN AccoRD wiTH CORPORATE By-LAws HELD VOID
Petitioner brought an Article 78 proceeding41 to have declared invalid both
an amendment to the by-laws of respondent corporation increasing the number
of its directors and the subsequent election of the new directors, as allegedly
authorized by the amended by-law. The Court of Appeals, in Sousa v. N.Y.
State Knights of Columbus,42 reversed both the Special Term,43 and the Appel-
late Division which had dismissed the petition.44 In doing so, however, the
Court declared the amendment itself valid, but held the election of directors
39. Supra note 31 at 144.
40. 8 N.Y.2d 377, 208 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1960).
41. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act art. 78.
42. 10 N.Y.2d 68, 217 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1961).
43. 26 MAsc. 2d 474, 203 N.Y.S.2d 3 .(Sup. Ct. 1960>.
44. 12 A.D.2d 956, 211 N.Y.S.2d 204 (2d Dep't 1961).
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